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Abstract 
Purpose – The European Commission (EC) is currently examining methods to increase the 
effectiveness of corporate governance disclosures. This article examines whether the Credit 
Rating Agencies, both on account of their influence within the marketplace and also their 
methodological approach to rating “Governance”, may have a greater role to play in the 
European Commission achieving those particular objectives.  
 
Design/Methodology/Approach – This article is based upon a normative methodology, 
upon which the issue is contextualised and a proposal is put forward regarding a 
methodological alteration that can be instituted by the credit rating agencies. 
 
Findings – The paper finds that the credit rating agencies may have a much greater role to 
play in meeting the objectives of the EC. Whilst the EC is focusing upon regulatory 
monitoring, the paper finds that there is a potential for a more efficient model within which 
the credit rating agencies adapt their methodologies to include ‘corporate governance 
disclosure’ into their rating processes. 
 
Originality/Value – In presenting the idea that the “comply or explain” principles put 
forward by the EC are proving to be somewhat ineffective, the paper contributes to the field 
by suggesting there are private endeavours which may add a sense of impact to disclosure 
proceedings, rather than the purely public regime being envisioned. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When making their investment decisions, investors use a variety of measures to assess where 
they should invest their resources. With the current trend being to focus on what is 
colloquially termed “ESG” (Environmental, Social, and Governance) criteria, mainstream 
investors have made clear that the most important element for them is the Governance 
criteria, with a recent survey suggesting that nearly three-quarters of respondents find 
‘Governance [to be] the main factor incorporated’ (CFA 2017, 5). It has been noted in the 
literature that a short-term approach was taken towards the concept of Governance in the 
lead-up to the Financial Crisis (McCluskey 2012, 26), and as such legislators and regulators 
have since aimed to address this issue. The European Commission, in focusing upon the 
information companies provide to the marketplace with regards to their compliancy with 
corporate governance regulations, have enforced that where companies deviate from 
governance codes, they must give details as to why (EC Directive 2006/46/EC). However, 
there have been a number of problems identified since this approach has been taken. Whilst 
companies have, by and large, failed to comply with the spirit of the regulatory endeavour, it 
has also been noted that there is an insufficient framework that surrounds the compliance-
related regulations, with the European Commission being unable to clearly identify who may 
take responsibility for monitoring, and the private marketplace being recognised as 
inadequate for providing a private solution; there exists in the marketplace specialist agencies 
who provide such monitoring services, but they have been found to lack the relevant 
expertise and resources to meet such a massive task (McCluskey 2012, 27).  
 
In this article, the aim will be to assess a market participant who may be able to meet that 
demand: the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). Upon analysing what the aims of the 
‘Corporate Governance Statement’ are and some of the problems that regulatory endeavour is 
facing, the article will go on to look at how the CRAs have been assessing ‘Governance’, and 
then whether their approach may be adapted to fulfil a vital need in the marketplace. There 
will be some discussion on another financial third-party – proxy advisors – because it is 
apparent that there exists plenty of capacity within the marketplace to undertake such roles. 
As we learn more about the issues raised, we will see that the issues identified correlate to a 
systemic occurrence, in that the impetus for such scrutiny tends to alleviate as the economic 
cycles oscillate, when what may be required is a counter-cyclic move. What is meant by this 
is that it may be the case that these third-parties need to increase their research into the 
governance of financial entities during periods when the demand for such aspects is reduced, 
mostly because in ‘boom’ periods investors are primarily concerned with returns, rather than 
how companies are governed – that alteration in perspective lies at the heart of the switch to 
long-termism (Griffith-Jones and Kimmis 2003, 93). Yet, in keeping with the request of the 
European Commission, that resolutions to these issues remain in the spirit of the compliance-
related regulations that were designed to enhance the informational flow within the 
marketplace, the article will conclude that the CRAs do have an important role to play, and a 
slight shift in their methodological approach may not only meet these needs, but contribute to 
a fundamental change in the ethos of the marketplace. 
 
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. The following section discusses the 
“Corporate Governance Statement” and the regulatory agenda being pursued in the EU 
currently, in relation to corporate governance. Section 3 examines the role of the credit rating 
agencies and examines how the concept of ‘governance’ is factored into their methodological 
processes. In section 4 the paper proposes a modified approach, whereby rating agencies may 
adapt their methodologies to assist with the regulatory agenda. Finally, the conclusion to the 
research conducted in the paper is established in Section 6. 
 
2. The Corporate Governance Statement: A Regulatory Agenda 
 
The European Commission, in detailing a 2006 Directive which has since been worked on 
and amended, stated that: 
Companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and which 
have their registered office in the Community should be obliged to disclose an annual 
corporate governance statement as a specific and clearly identifiable section of the 
annual report. The statement should at least provide shareholders with easily 
accessible key information about the corporate governance practices actually applied, 
including a description of the main features of any existing risk management systems 
and internal controls in relation to the financial reporting process (EC Directive 
2006/46/EC). 
An element of this Directive was to, essentially, enshrine the regulatory concept of ‘comply 
or explain’, whereby a company must disclose whether it has complied with a given code (or 
codes), and provide information for why they have not complied if they have chosen not to 
do so. The aim of ‘comply or explain’ is to provide a flexible regulatory framework, within 
which the companies ought to comply with the framework, but have the option of not doing 
so if the framework does not fit well with a specific element of their business. Additionally, 
the comply or explain principle offers an opportunity to increase the efficiency of the 
informational flow within the marketplace, with it being noted by an analytics organisation 
who provided the EC with the data for their Directive analysis that the aim is to ‘provide 
qualitative and comprehensive input that can subsequently be used by market players to make 
informed decisions’ (RiskMetrics 2009, 179). The regulatory approach has been adopted 
within a number of jurisdictions, with the U.K. incorporating the approach after the Cadbury 
Report in 1992. Sir Adrian Cadbury once stated that a clear advantage of the approach is that 
‘through time the relevance of recommendations to board effectiveness and accountability 
become clear’ (Cadbury 2002, 199). The sentiment behind Sir Cadbury’s view is that the 
larger regulatory framework can identify themes on the back of compliancy rates, and then 
act to either remove them from the equation (if found to be not useful), or enshrine them 
within statutes (if found to be of importance), ultimately resulting in a more efficient 
regulatory system. However, since the EC has incorporated this approach into their 
framework, they have found that a number of dynamics are affecting the efficiency of the 
approach. 
 
In a ‘Green Paper’ published in 2011, the European Commission noted the difficulties the 
approach has faced since being incorporated. In relation to the act of companies detailing 
why they have deviated from a given Corporate Governance Code, a study commissioned by 
the EC found that ‘the overall quality of companies’ corporate governance statements when 
departing from a corporate governance code recommendation is unsatisfactory’, with it being 
found that in more than 60% of recorded cases, the companies did not provide sufficient 
information for their departures (EC 2011, 18). Whilst the cited report noted that the problem 
is not observed throughout the community – the UK, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands 
had the highest proportion of ‘informative’ explanations recorded (RiskMetrics 2009, 170) – 
it did find that the lack of informative disclosure is having a demonstrable effect upon the 
marketplace’s view of the approach, with only a quarter of investors being found to consider 
the quality of companies’ disclosures as ‘sufficiently good’. There is an argument to be had 
that countries such as the UK may well provide for more complete informational disclosures 
as the UK has been using the comply or explain approach for longer than the EU, but the EC 
has been trying to press ahead with potential solutions to the problems, rather than attempt to 
allow the principles of the regulatory approach to take greater effect over time.  
 
One of the EC’s potential responses lays in the concept of regulatory authorities from within 
member states taking a greater role in monitoring the disclosures of companies. In discussing 
this, the EC is clear in its thinking when it states that ‘in most Member States, responsibility 
for enforcing the obligation to publish is left to investors who, depending on the culture and 
traditions in their Member States, often take little action… few Member States have public or 
specialised authorities check the completeness of the information provided (in particular, the 
explanations)’. The EC continues by declaring that comply or explain ‘could work much 
better if monitoring bodies such as securities regulators, stock exchanges, or other authorities 
were authorised to check whether the available information (in particular, the explanations) is 
sufficiently informative and comprehensive’ (EC 2011, 19). However, there have been issues 
with this approach identified in the literature, with it being asserted that the divergence across 
the globalised marketplace does not fit neatly in to this approach (Hermes et al 2006, 284), 
and that the approach does not actually have a clear effect upon the culture of firms (ibid 
296). Whilst the EC does state that the approach should be aimed at companies registered 
within the community, the argument regarding the impact upon the migration of capital is 
still valid, as too is the declaration that comply or explain may not have a positive effect upon 
a company’s culture, at least in the short- to mid-term. However, before we continue, there is 
merit to focusing on the fact that many companies do not provide sufficient information in 
their disclosures. That they do not raises a number of questions, and many of those questions 
point to issues that are systemic in nature. 
 
MacNeil and Li suggest that two views can be taken with regards to the lack of informative 
disclosure cited in the EC’s commissioned report. One of the reasons may be that near 60% 
of the companies analysed are in full compliance with their stated codes, but the scholars 
worry that, in fact, the issue may be that ‘the market is not particularly concerned about non-
compliance and there are no credible sanctions’ (MacNeil and Li 2006, 488). There is a clear 
argument here that ‘short-termism’ is also a factor, in that the focus on short-term results, 
even to the point of only focusing on the next quarter’s financial results (Rappaport and 
Bogle 2011, 6), essentially trumps the consequences of non-compliance (and that suggests 
that a company acknowledges those consequences because, if MacNeil and Li are correct, 
then the absence of an acknowledged framework for sanctions will only contribute to short-
termism). Whilst MacNeil and Li stated this in 2006, the EC’s current approach of suggesting 
that national regulatory bodies should take the lead in monitoring these disclosures suggests 
little has changed in the way of an efficient enforcement regime to accompany the comply or 
explain framework. Yet, whilst this points towards a failing on the behalf of regulators, it has 
also been suggested that the failing lies with the system moreover. For example, in opposition 
to the calls for national bodies to take the lead, the British regulator The Financial Reporting 
Council has been noted as stating that ‘it is the task of the shareholders and the markets to 
monitor what directors say in their statements’ (Keay 2015, 217). The lack of a defined 
approach to enforcing these regulatory endeavours, with two regulators in particular 
favouring opposing enforcement approaches (the EU favours regulatory action and the FRC 
favours investor action), suggests that the aim of encouraging long-termism is no closer to 
being met, even after such a defining event as the financial crisis. 
 
In discussing the dynamic between investors, shareholders, and the companies who are being 
mandated to disclose their corporate governance practices, MacNeil and Li suggest that a 
better way to understand the reality of the situation would be to understand the framework as 
‘comply or perform’, rather than ‘comply or explain’. What the scholars mean by this is that 
investors are accustomed to understanding the efficiency of a company’s corporate 
governance practice in relation to their financial performance, with investors being ‘willing 
to accept a company’s judgement as regards substance when times are good, but are less (or 
not) willing to accept it when financial performance is poor’ (MacNeil and Li 2006, 492). It 
has been noted elsewhere in the literature that this concept of the investors focusing on their 
returns, above all else, is what is driving corporations to alter their approach to satisfy this 
short-termism-based demand (Redhead 2008, 248), with the EU itself lamenting the 
“passive” approach taken by many shareholders (Sikka and Stittle 2017, 2). Frentrop seeks to 
deconstruct the concept of a modern ‘investor’ in light of the pre-eminence of the 
‘institutional shareholder’ led by managers, ultimately suggesting that the quest for 
managerial fees and compensation may be at the heart of the increase of short-termism 
(Frentrop 2012). Yet, whilst this ‘cognitive bias’ puts the responsibility at the feet of 
investors (which is not invalid), the actions of investors are extremely complicated. They are 
complicated because of the costs associated with performing this monitoring role; investors 
(whether retail or institutional) will be unlikely to engage in this research, as the costs 
associated somewhat negate the actual act of investing. To this end, it has been discussed 
widely in the literature that investors will ‘routinely [adopt] a proxy to judge the merits of 
non-compliance’ (ibid 490), which in turn reduces their costs. It has also been noted that 
proxies may be better placed to encourage the effective running of a company (on a 
shareholder’s behalf) because of their experience in dealing with the intricacies of 
corporations (Köndgen 1993, 541). Whilst this article is focusing upon the role that CRAs 
may play in this position as a ‘proxy’, there is actually another industry which contains much 
bigger players in this field.  
 
It is not the intention of this article to examine corporate governance advisory firms, 
otherwise known more colloquially as ‘proxy advisors’, because the focus of this article is on 
credit rating agencies and the subject has been covered in great detail within the literature 
already by noted scholars (Ringe 2016, 76-78; Ferri 2012, 195-197; de Luca 2017, 254-255; 
Bakewell and Darazsdi 2014, 185-196). However, to provide context, it is worth discussing 
the role they play within the disclosure-dynamic we are assessing here, together with some of 
the inherent problems that persist within this particular industry (many of which are shared 
with the Credit Rating Industry, for a number of reasons). The market for proxy advisors 
contain a number of key players, but the dominant players are Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis. To compare the two industries, ISS records annual revenues 
in excess of $13 billion, whilst Moody’s records annual revenues of $4 billion). The proxy 
advisors exist to provide recommendations based upon their assessments of the internal 
structures of companies, although it is has been stated (somewhat counterintuitively) that ‘as 
a result of inevitable resource limitations’ and companies’ insistence of ‘bunching’ their 
disclosures, proxy advisors are often ‘either unwilling or unable to afford qualitative 
consideration to companies’ explanations for non-compliance with the Code, but instead opt 
to treat reasoned deviation from any Code provision as tantamount to simple breach’ (Moore 
and Petrin 2017, 66). Yet, and again in a counterintuitive manner, it is still recognised as the 
case that ‘for many matters they [proxy advisors] have become the de-factor arbiters of good 
governance’ (OECD 2011, 61). Initially, this dynamic appears to be negative, in that 
investors are enlisting the services of agencies which do not invest in, nor have the technical 
ability (owing to the timing of company disclosures) to provide accurate corporate 
governance assessments, but the reality is much different. The reality alludes to a systemic 
dynamic that cannot be ignored, which is that dispersed investors will be mainly interested in 
return on investment above all else. It was mentioned earlier that short-sightedness was cited 
as a founding cause of the Financial Crisis, and understanding that investors use proxy 
advisors because they find it more cost-efficient to outsource their corporate governance 
analyses (Barker 2011, 157; Wen 2013, 232; Sheehan 2012, 121) seems to suggest that the 
short-sightedness is still prevalent in the marketplace. These factors allude to a core issue 
within the concept of displaced shareholders who, unless subscribed to some notion of 
directed investing (like, for example, ethical investment institutions), are focused on the rate 
of return on their investment. This again links to the concept of investors being willing to 
accept corporate governance practices if the company’s financial performance is adequate. 
Furthermore, that investors are willing to forego this important aspect of their business by 
instead incorporating the views of an oligopolistic industry beset with conflicts of interest 
(Ringe 2016, 77) is, perhaps, further evidence of the investors’ reluctance to take a greater 
role in improving the corporate governance within firms (as well as how they communicate 
their governance practices). To digress, the sentiment afforded by the FRC earlier, that 
investors are the vehicle within which change can be established, seems to be inherently 
flawed on this basis of fundamental short-sightedness within the mainstream investment 
market.   
 
However, Moore and Petrin make the point that in this particular area, it is likely to be 
‘private dynamics’ that initiate positive change, rather than public dynamics or administrative 
enforcement (Moore and Petrin 2017, 63). This is in opposition to the EC’s push to 
incorporate national regulators into the framework more, but understanding the crucial 
importance of investor action suggests that Moore and Petrin may be correct in their 
understanding. Perhaps, as the scholars suggest, it is more pertinent to think of the framework 
as a public/private ‘hybrid’ of sorts – in that there may need to exist a system within which 
regulators seek to enforce certain parts of the governance disclosure regime, and private 
entities increase their efforts to enforce increased disclosure in other sectors, via investor 
activism or third-party pressure, for example - which brings us back to the objectives of this 
article. There are clearly issues within the EC’s comply or explain framework, and that can 
likely be put down to the concept of there being a divergence between what the regulators 
envision is the reality, and what the reality of the situation actually is (Cash 2018a). This 
dynamic, unfortunately, is commonplace when it comes to regulators attempting to assert 
their authority over the actions (whether directly or indirectly) of dispersed investors. The 
reality of the situation is that dispersed investors are predominantly concerned with their 
returns (certainly in relation to so-called ‘mainstream investors’), and as such cannot be 
corralled into taking decisions that will have long-term systemic benefits but that will incur 
short-term losses. Whilst we have discussed how one financial third-party is not performing 
adequately within this particular dynamic, that should not deter us from assessing another 
financial third-party that has expertise within this field of providing opinions on companies 
for the benefit of dispersed investors. 
 
3. The Role of the Credit Rating Agencies 
 
Credit rating agencies, in general, provide opinions on the creditworthiness of a given entity 
(corporate, sovereign, or financial instrument), but within their analyses are a number of 
particular elements which make up the cumulative rating they provide. With the growth of 
the ‘ESG’ concept within the sector, the leading rating agencies have been at pains to declare 
that they do indeed incorporate ESG considerations into their analyses, particularly now that 
they have aligned with the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) movement initiated 
by the United Nations in the wake of the Financial Crisis (both S&P and Moody’s are 
signatories). In addressing concerns that the agencies do not incorporate ESG into their rating 
methodologies enough, Standard & Poor’s (the leading CRA) stated that ‘ESG factors are 
analysed at various points in ratings methodology’, although environmental and social 
aspects are not routinely incorporated into assessing the business risk profile (PRI 2017, 20). 
In relation to corporate governance, which is what we are concerned with here, S&P noted 
that ‘management decision making and the effectiveness of board oversight are further 
reviewed and assessed with the management and governance modifier in our ratings 
methodology’ (ibid), which has a number of connotations. The first is that it is clear that the 
CRAs do indeed incorporate ESG into their methodologies, but it is interesting to note what 
S&P has decided is pertinent governance information; the disclosure of these practices does 
not seem to be factored in. However, before we look at this important issue further, there is 
an error in the literature that needs to be highlighted. 
 
Many resources in the literature state that CRAs consider corporate governance in their 
methodologies. Some have gone further by stating that ‘since the 1990s, credit rating 
agencies have offered corporate governance assessments with the aim of evaluating 
governance risk’ (Louizi and Kammoun 2016, 363). This author has argued elsewhere that it 
is of crucial importance that every minute detail is scrutinised when it comes to 
understanding the CRAs, and this represents another occasion where an error assists with the 
overly-positive understanding of the CRAs role and usefulness. Writing in 2016, the authors 
praise S&P for providing ‘Corporate Governance System ratings (CGS), stating that S&P 
‘was one of the first agencies to evaluate the quality of companies’ corporate governance 
systems by developing a specific rating (ibid 365) that focused upon elements like director 
compensation, the usage of company resources, bonus systems, and accounting controls. 
However, this reaction to the Enron-era was not continued, with S&P discontinuing 
production of these ratings in 2004/5 (Taub 2005). In actual fact, S&P did not begin to utilise 
their ‘management and governance modifier’ until 2012/13, which suggests to us that the 
arguments detailed earlier, that investors are willing to rely on financial performance alone 
when the economy is in its ‘boom’ period, is rather accurate.  
 
Returning to the issue of governance and how the agencies view it when developing their 
ratings, two aspects are abundantly clear. Investors are absolutely certain that Governance is 
the most important element of ESG, with the PRI sourcing statements from their 1800 
investor signatories: one stated that Governance ‘is always the most important factor and 
always will be’, while another stated that ‘the biggest weight in our process is governance’ – 
these are very much representative of the qualitative responses (PRI 2017). The rating 
agencies concur, with a number of agencies confirming that ‘governance is the core analytical 
driver’ (Scope Ratings), ‘Governance is more important because it is more volatile and thus 
moves markets’ (S&P), and that ‘governance is very important to us, interviews start with 
governance issues because they are fundamentally important for the continuity of the firm’ 
(Liberum Ratings). Initial forays into this qualitative collection are extremely positive, with 
all sides and the PRI affirming that both parties are allocating more resources than ever 
before to focus upon ESG-related issues (PRI 2017, 11), which for the CRAs includes hiring 
dedicated ESG analysts and making a concerted effort to communicate how ESG is being 
incorporated into their methodological processes. However, whilst the PRI’s analysis is 
extremely useful and initially very positive, it does not last. Whilst it has been noted in the 
narrow literature on this issue that there is a notable variance between ratings methodologies 
within the different agencies anyway (Louizi and Kammoun 2016, 375), it is the agencies’ 
views on the importance of Governance in reality that makes for interesting reading.  
 
Methodologically, the CRAs have an issue with the usefulness of ESG incorporation (even 
the Governance element which has been described by CRAs as being particularly important) 
because of what they label as ‘forward visibility’. Their arguments are that, for corporate 
bonds certainly, it is extremely difficult to incorporate aspects of Governance into the ratings 
analysis when the terms of the corporate bonds are not particularly extended. The sentiment 
behind this line of reasoning is that corporate bond rating users want to know of the 
creditworthiness of the issuing entity over a given (and often limited) timeframe, and 
incorporating analysis that may dictate there are underlying governance issues which may 
take years to come to fruition are not relevant for those users. That perhaps makes sense, to 
some extent, as the agencies’ ‘vision’ will often differ depending upon the type of bond that 
they are rating. However, this has not stopped investors from criticising the CRAs, with some 
being noted as stating ‘there is scope to better capture indirect, embedded ESG risks which 
are values/supply chain related’, to which Moody’s responded by stating that ‘ESG 
considerations are rarely the main driver of credit outcomes. Broader ratings factors – notably 
the financial strength of a given debt issuer – will typically form a more important part of our 
credit assessment’ (PRI 2017, 28; Moody’s 2015). S&P concurred with their oligopolistic 
partner, stating that ‘credit ratings for corporates have a shorter time horizon than the time 
horizon over which most ESG risks tend to materialise and this is causing perception issues’ 
(PRI 2017 26). These determinations raise the question of whether the CRAs can ever fulfil 
their pledge to fully incorporate the principles dictated by the PRI. 
 
However, rather than their actual incorporation of ESG considerations into their 
methodological analyses, the PRI has determined that one of the biggest issues affecting the 
CRA/PRI relationship is one of disclosure; the PRI state that ‘the main challenge for CRAs is 
on the disclosure and transparency front, not so much on putting in place an ESG integration 
framework, which they have already’ (ibid 17). The PRI investor signatories go further by 
declaring that they believe that ‘CRAs should take a more proactive approach to highlighting 
ESG considerations into their analysis’ (ibid 27). The signatories appear to be calling for 
more communication of how ESG integrates into the rating process whether or not it affects 
the creditworthiness of the issuing entity, which alludes to a call to fundamentally change the 
fabric of the modern marketplace. Yet, whilst it is not an invalid request, the agencies are 
clear that there are underlying difficulties in meeting that need, with S&P in its most recent 
update to their management and governance criteria declaring that the subfactor is the most 
subjective and qualitative aspect to their business (S&P 2012, 52). 
 
Whilst the divergence between the two parties is clear, the dynamics underpinning that 
relationship are less so. One of the most important underlying dynamics is that despite 
regulatory endeavours to reduce ‘credit rating addiction’ (Cash 2018b), it is still the case that 
‘a majority [of investors are] also constrained by ratings, either because investors 
benchmarked their investments against indices (which in turn may be partially constrained by 
credit ratings) or because their investment strategy or that of their clients has credit rating 
limits’ (PRI 2017, 33). So on one side the flow of capital is being fed through the credit rating 
industry, but on the other the CRAs have an enormous amount of power at their disposal. The 
literature is clear on this, with it being asserted that ‘credit rating agencies may even be in a 
position to exercise an explicit veto over certain options (in the corporate governance of firms 
or the economic policies of a state) by using a ratings downgrade’, and that ‘there is indeed a 
high degree of compliance with credit rating agencies’ standards… [public and private 
market actors] tend to adjust their behaviour to meet the criteria of creditworthiness set by 
credit rating agencies’ (Kruck 2011, 65). Whilst this could lead to an interesting debate about 
whether the profit-driven focus of market participants (and perhaps even the short-
sightedness discussed earlier) is being developed by the rating agencies, or whether they are 
merely reacting to that culture, our focus must remain on the potential role that the agencies 
may play in improving the quality of corporate governance statements. 
 4. Utilising an Existing Framework 
 
Leaving aside the deficiencies within the proxy advisor industry for one moment, there is 
plenty that could be done within the ratings industry to positively affect the issues identified 
by the European Commission. With investors putting pressure on the agencies to adapt their 
methodological approach and, in truth with the CRAs seemingly taking some notice, there 
exists an opportunity now to enact meaningful change in the sector. With the move by the 
leading agencies to incorporate ESG further into their analyses with the hiring of specialist 
ESG analysts (and through targeted M&A strategies – S&P’s recent purchasing of ‘Trucost’ 
alludes to this further), it is not unimaginable that the leading agencies could add the concept 
of corporate governance disclosure to their methodological approaches. If they were to do so, 
the aspects of the underlying dynamic that exists between investors, issuing companies, and 
the CRAs could have a positive effect upon the quality of the corporate governance 
statements. Imagine for one moment that corporate governance disclosures were factored into 
ratings in a systematic manner; what may happen is that issuing companies could have their 
ratings negatively affected if they deviate from a corporate governance code but then 
subsequently provide insufficient information for why they chose to do so – alternatively, a 
company could have their credit rating enhanced if they deviated but provided sufficient 
information for their decision. This altered approach would fall neatly into the European 
Commission’s insistence that solutions to the problems identified fall within the ‘spirit’ of the 
comply or explain Directive, and would also potentially develop a pathway for the financial 
system to move away from the short-termism that has been identified as plaguing the 
marketplace. Whether the agencies would make this methodological alteration and 
communicate this thoroughly to the marketplace is, in truth, unknown, but the potential for 
this to take place does exist, and more importantly would represent a practical solution to the 
issue of unsatisfactory corporate governance disclosures.  
It was discussed earlier how the EC is placing emphasis upon the need for regulatory bodies 
to take a greater role in monitoring disclosure rates from companies caught by the EC 
Directives regarding corporate governance statements. It was also mentioned that the FRC in 
the UK see the investors as being the vehicle for change and control within this sector, again 
in relation to the disclosures from companies. However, both of these aims contain obvious 
flaws, with the EC’s approach resulting in increased expenditure for regulatory bodies, and 
the FRC’s approach resulting in a request for increased activism from investors who, as we 
have seen, are apparently configured to do the opposite (as long as they see the returns they 
require, of course). Therefore, there is a potential for the need for a ‘middle-ground’ approach 
which may enable the same results to be obtained, and in the credit rating agencies there 
exists the potential to achieve that aim. The sanctioning power attached to the ratings of the 
agencies present the opportunity to encourage increased disclosure rates – on the basis of 
potentially achieving a higher rating as a result – and also provide a real sanction that is 
apparently missing from the marketplace. If the rating agencies were to add this dynamic to 
their methodologies, particularly in conjunction with the ‘governance’ element of their rating 
methodologies that exist already, then that small methodological alteration could have a 
massive impact upon the aims of the regulatory system being developed by the EC. It is a 
widely-held view that the rating agencies possess a massive ‘power’ or ‘influence’ within the 
marketplace (Serrano 2013, 47; Partnoy 2002, 66), and it is suggested here that this ‘power’ 
be utilised to assist in achieving the objectives of increased disclosure rates in relation to the 
‘corporate governance statement’. Not only may this approach achieve the objectives set, but 
it would also allow for regulatory bodies to allocate their resources to other initiatives, whilst 
also utilising a market mechanism that many (institutional) investors already utilise; the 
development of this ‘hybrid’ approach has the potential to create many benefits for a number 
of parties. Furthermore, the methodological alteration required would be more than 
achievable for the agencies, and would enhance their position within the dynamic that exists 
between them and the investors who utilise their services.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The European Commission’s objectives of improving the quality of corporate governance 
statement disclosures is indeed a very important one, because the community needs the 
‘comply or explain’ principle to be fundamentally incorporated into the financial fabric 
within the community. However, whilst the EC has been hinting at incorporating a public 
solution to the problem, there is merit to the suggestion that a private, or at least a ‘hybrid’ 
solution would be more practicable. In presenting the idea that the CRAs could adapt their 
methodologies to incorporate the quality of CG statement disclosure into their 
methodological processes, this article has endeavoured to offer that ‘hybrid’ solution. 
However, the task of implementing the comply or explain regulatory framework should be 
viewed from as wide a perspective as possible, with the emphasis being on the concept of a 
framework; there is no reason why the CRAs and proxy advisors could not both incorporate 
this aim into their methodologies, because it is clear there is an appetite amongst investors. 
Whilst these financial third parties may claim that extra resources would be needed to 
conduct and incorporate such analyses, the long-term understanding may be that the third 
parties would become even more integral to the financial system, which would further ensure 
their continued successes. Yet, the most important aspect is that the EC’s objective of 
establishing the ‘comply or explain’ principle would be given the ‘teeth’ it is lacking 
currently, which has been noted to be one of the largest impediments to its successful 
implementation. 
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